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Abstract. This paper presents a methodology to as-
sess agricultural-to-hydropower water transfers in water re-
sources systems where irrigation crop production and hy-
dropower generation are the main economic activities. In
many countries, water for crop irrigation is often considered
as a static asset: irrigation water is usually allocated by a
system of limited annual rights to use a prescribed volume
of water, which remains to a large extent independent of
the availability of water in the basin. The opportunity cost
(forgone beneﬁts) of this static management approach may
be important in river basins where large irrigation areas are
present in the upstreamreaches. Continuously adjusting allo-
cation decisions based on the hydrologic status of the system
will lead to the temporary reallocation of some (or all) of
the irrigation water downstream to consumptive and/or non-
consumptive users. Such a dynamic allocation process will
increase the social beneﬁts if the sum of the downstream pro-
ductivities exceeds those of the upstream farmers whose enti-
tlements are curtailed. However, this process will be socially
acceptable if upstream farmers are compensated for increas-
ing the availability of water downstream. This paper also
presents a methodology to derive the individual contribu-
tion of downstream non-consumptive users, i.e. hydropower
plants, to the ﬁnancial compensation of upstream farmers.
This dynamic management approach is illustrated with a cas-
cade of multipurpose reservoirs in the Euphrates river basin.
The analysis of simulation results reveals that, on average,
the annual beneﬁts obtained with the dynamic allocation pro-
cess are 6% higher that those derived from a static alloca-
tion.
Correspondence to: A. Tilmant
(a.tilmant@unesco-ihe.org)
1 Introduction
As the competition for water is likely to increase in the
near future due to socioeconomic development and popula-
tion growth, water resources managers will face hard choices
when allocating water between competing users. Because
water is a vital resource used in multiple sectors, including
the environment, the allocation is inherently a political and
social process, which is likely to become increasingly scruti-
nized as the competition grows between the different sectors.
Since markets are usually absent or ineffective, the allocation
of water between competing demands is achieved adminis-
tratively taking into account key, often conﬂicting, objectives
such as economic efﬁciency, equity and maintaining the eco-
logical integrity. Various allocation mechanisms have been
developedinordertoreconciletheefﬁciencyandequityprin-
ciples (Dinar et al., 1997; Molle et al., 2007). Another dif-
ﬁculty associated with water resources management comes
from the fact that many water using activities generate exter-
nalities downstream. Since water ﬂows downstream together
with the externalities the natural spatial scale at which water
allocation decisions can be made is the river basin. Policy
instruments designed to achieve a certain level of economic
efﬁciency and equity should therefore best be developed and
implemented at that scale (Davis, 2007).
Whencropirrigationisinvolved, waterisusuallyallocated
by a system of annual rights to use a ﬁxed, static volume
of water, which is typically less than what farmers would
expect (Young, 2005). Farmers’ demand for water is de-
rived from the value of its use in crop production, which
in turn depends on crop water requirements and crop prices.
In the residual method, which is one of the most common
valuation methods used in irrigated agriculture, one usu-
ally assumes constant crop water requirements (Ward and
Michelsen, 2002; Gibbons, 1986). The South-eastern Ana-
tolia Project in Turkey, for example, was planned with a
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ﬁxed irrigation water demand of about 10000m3/ha/yr (Ko-
lars and Mitchell, 1994; Beaumont, 1996). In the Maule river
basininChile, becausenon-consumptivewaterrightsheldby
power companies cannot negatively affect prior consumptive
water rights enjoyed by farmers, hydropower companies are
bound to respect pre-deﬁned monthly release targets reﬂect-
ing agricultural demands (Tilmant et al., 2007). Considering
constant irrigation water demands is also a common assump-
tion in multiobjective optimization models for reservoir op-
eration(Labadie,2004;Yeh,1985). Intheconstraintmethod,
for example, the irrigation objective is removed from the ob-
jective function and irrigation withdrawals are rather consid-
ered as additional constraints to reﬂect the priority given to
the agricultural sector and the (nearly) constant water de-
mands. Oven-Thompson et al. (1982) determine the trade-
off relationship between irrigation and hydropower genera-
tion for the High-Aswan dam using the constraint method.
The same multiobjective method is used in Tilmant and Kel-
man (2007) to assess the hydrological risk in the multireser-
voir system of the Euphrates river basin. In ReVelle (1999),
irrigation withdrawals are chosen so as to minimize the de-
viation from predeﬁned target demands. When crop-water
production functions are available, they can be included in
the analysis using integrated hydrologic-economic models
(Ward et al., 2006; Cai et al., 2003; Rosegrant et al., 2000;
Booker and Young, 1994). In Vedula and Kumar (1996), the
steady-state operating rules of an irrigation reservoir are de-
rived from a hybrid linear programming-stochastic dynamic
programming(LP-SDP)modelthattakesintoaccountthead-
ditive form of the crop yield response function. In this paper
we will consider that water demands from the agricultural
sector are driven by crop water requirements and that wa-
ter is administratively allocated using either ﬁxed (static) or
variable (dynamic) entitlements.
Moving from a static to a dynamic allocation process in
a fully-allocated basin implies that the policies are regularly
updated according to the hydrologic status of the river basin.
It also contributes to the development of river basin manage-
ment strategies that increase the productivity of water. Dy-
namic management approaches are commonly used in the
hydropower sector, both in regulated and deregulated elec-
tricity markets. In regulated electricity markets, an Indepen-
dent System Operator (ISO) produces a dispatch based on
a least-cost criterion (also called “merit-order” operation):
hydropower plants are dispatched so as to minimize the ex-
pected operating costs of the hydrothermal electrical sys-
tem over a given planning period (e.g. 5 years). This exer-
cise is regularly updated according to the status of the sys-
tem which includes the storage levels in the reservoirs and
the latest hydrologic information (Pereira, 1989). In dereg-
ulated electricity markets, hydropower companies dynami-
cally manage their assets, which now also include a port-
folio of contracts, by generating energy, selling/purchasing
energy on the spot market, and selling/purchasing contracts
(Scott and Read, 1996; Fleten, 2000; Barosso et al., 2002).
Again, these decisions are regularly updated as hydrologic
conditions, spot prices and ﬁnancial position change. In a
multipurpose multireservoir system, continuously adjusting
release and withdrawal decisions based on the latest hydro-
logic information will increase the beneﬁts derived from the
system. However, the extent to which such an adjustment
can be achieved results from complex spatial and temporal
interactions between the physical characteristics of the water
resources system (storage, natural ﬂows), the economic and
social consequences of rationing and the impacts on natural
ecosystems.
As mentioned earlier, a dynamic management approach
increases the productivity of water by continuously adjust-
ing allocation decisions based on the status of the water re-
sources system. In other words, such an approach should
lead to economic efﬁcient allocation decisions. However,
economic efﬁciency is not the only objective when allocating
water between competing users, and must often be traded-
off against equity considerations. Equity objectives are con-
cerned with fairness or justice and tend to redistribute the
resources itself or the beneﬁts associated with the use of
the resource. When dealing with water resources allocation
problems, the equity objectives can take various forms in-
cluding basic water services or minimum physical allocation.
Such egalitarian policies are often criticized by neoclassical
economists on the grounds that they entail efﬁciency losses.
To operationalize the notion of equity, egalitarian societies
tend to equalize income or welfare by making those who are
currently poor better off without signiﬁcant cost to those who
are not poor. In a river basin, operationalizing the notion
of equity implies that the redistribution of beneﬁts comes
down to sharing the beneﬁts rather the water itself (Sadoff
and Grey, 2002; Fisher et al., 2005). In practice, however,
redistributing beneﬁts may become a difﬁcult task when wa-
ter users are distributed along a river and when their uses
generate externalities downstream. Irrigation, for example,
reduces the availability of water downstream by decreasing
the volume of water ﬂowing in the river and degrading the
quality of water through polluted return ﬂows. A storage
hydroelectric power plant can generate downstream beneﬁts
by reducing the impact of ﬂooding, increasing groundwater
recharge and maintaining base ﬂows, etc. But at the same
time, it can also generate negative externalities on down-
stream ecosystems by, for example, trapping sediments and
altering the natural hydrological regime of the river. Braden
and Johnston (2004) and Johnston et al. (2006), for example,
evaluate the downstream economic beneﬁts associated with
improved storm water management strategies. The beneﬁts
from shifting water from the agricultural to the municipal
and industrial sectors in the Maipo river basin are analyzed
using an integrated hydrologic-economic model in Rosegrant
etal.(2000). Theopportunitycostofirrigationdevelopments
in the upper reaches of the Euphrates-Tigris river basin is
assessed through scenario analysis in Tilmant and Kelman
(2007).
Hydrol. Earth Syst. Sci., 13, 1091–1101, 2009 www.hydrol-earth-syst-sci.net/13/1091/2009/A. Tilmant et al.: Agricultural-to-hydropower 1093
In the above examples, the difﬁculty to allocate water be-
tween a downstream and an upstream users is that the former
relies on the latter through a natural phenomenon, namely
the hydrological cycle. Because water ﬂows from upstream
to downstream, an upstream water user is likely to impact,
whether positively and/or negatively, his downstream neigh-
bor. This asymmetrical relationship implies that
– if an equitable sharing of water is to be achieved, the
upstream user will have to forgo some of his potential
beneﬁts;
– if an (economic) efﬁcient sharing of water is to be
achieved, an upstream water user will have to pay or to
receive from the downstream user compensation for the
negative or positive externalities the upstream user gen-
erates downstream (Nkomo and van der Zaag, 2004).
In a cascade of reservoirs with both consumptive and non-
consumptive users, the economically efﬁcient allocation de-
cision will depend on the difference between the productivity
of the local consumptive user and the sum of the productiv-
ities of downstream non-consumptive users. In other words,
at a given site in a hydropower-irrigation system, the decision
to release water downstream or withdraw it will be based on
the comparison of the aggregated productivity of the farmers
at that site and the sum of productivities of all hydropower
plants located downstream of that site. Consequently, ev-
erything else being equal, upstream farmers are likely to be
affected by a dynamic allocation process. As mentioned ear-
lier, a proper compensation scheme must therefore be estab-
lished which can consider the individual losses and bene-
ﬁts. A cascade of hydropower-irrigation reservoir in the Eu-
phrates will be used for illustrative purposes.
2 Material and methods
2.1 Sharing water and beneﬁts: a two-step approach
The proposed framework for sharing water resources and
their beneﬁts in a hydropower-irrigation system relies on a
two-step procedure. Economically efﬁcient allocations poli-
cies are ﬁrst identiﬁed with the help of an optimization model
that seeks to maximize basin-wide net beneﬁts. Then, the ﬁ-
nancial compensations are calculated from the optimal allo-
cation decisions and marginal water values, which are both
available at the optimal solution of the allocation model.
When formulating the water resources allocation problem
as an optimization problem, we make the assumption that
the river basin is managed by a single institution, an imagi-
nary river basin authority, that maximizes the economic net
beneﬁts generated in the basin. With the static allocation
scheme, irrigation withdrawals are essentially independent
of the status of the water resources system, i.e. the storage
levels in the reservoirs and the inﬂows. In other words, irri-
gation water rights are met as long as there is enough water
in the system. In that case the allocation problem reduces
to scheduling releases from the hydropower stations. In the
dynamic allocation scheme, both irrigation withdrawals and
hydropower releases are key decisions variables that are now
directly inﬂuenced by the status of the system, and that will
be selected so as to maximize basin-wide net beneﬁts. Since
the extent and timing of agricultural-to-hydropower water
transfers are expected to vary with the availability of water in
the basin, a stochastic hydro-economic optimization model,
called Stochastic Dual Dynamic Programming (SDDP), will
be implemented.
Dynamically managing a water resources system implies
that the users at the margin, i.e. the users that are likely
to be rationed, must be compensated by those who beneﬁt
from the dynamic allocation. If a ﬁnancial compensation
were to be implemented, the compensation should be at least
equal to the forgone beneﬁts of those users at the margin.
In a hydropower-irrigation system where several consump-
tive and non-consumptive users are competing for water, up-
stream consumptive users are likely to be the ﬁrst to see their
entitlements curtailed since they compete with downstream
users who can form a coalition to increase their productivity,
which will lead to a reallocation downstream. Since several
downstream users may beneﬁt from the reallocation of up-
stream water, we need a mechanism to assess the individual
contribution of each beneﬁciary to the ﬁnancial compensa-
tion of the affected upstream user. As we will see later, the
individual contribution of the beneﬁciary user should be pro-
portional to its productivity.
2.2 Stochastic dual dynamic programming
As mentioned earlier, two SDDP formulations will be used
to derive the allocation decisions and the relevant economic
information. The ﬁrst formulation seeks to maximize the net
beneﬁts from hydropower generation by considering ﬁxed al-
lotments to the irrigation sector as in a static allocation pro-
cess. The second formulation seeks to maximize the aggre-
gated net beneﬁts from both the irrigation and hydropower
sectors by identifying optimal release rt(j) and withdrawal
it(j) decisions at each site j and for each time t∈[1...T]
whereT isthelengthoftheplanningperiod. Thissecondfor-
mulation corresponds to a dynamic management approach.
SDDP extends the traditional discrete stochastic dynamic
programming (SDP) to handle a large state space, i.e. a large
number of reservoirs and allocation decisions. In SDP, allo-
cation decisions are made to maximize current beneﬁts plus
the expected beneﬁts from future operation, which are rep-
resented by the recursively calculated beneﬁt-to-go function
Ft+1 (Tejada-Guibert et al., 1993) . In SDDP, this beneﬁt-
to-go function is approximated by a piecewise linear func-
tion through sampling and decomposition; for each sam-
pled values of the state variables a hyperplane (cut) is con-
structed and provides an outer approximation of the beneﬁt-
to-go function. Intuitively, the computational effort should
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be reduced since the value of Ft+1 can now be derived by
extrapolation instead of interpolation as in SDP.
Let st be the vector of storage volumes at the beginning
of time period t; rt be the vector of releases at the beginning
of time period t; qt be the vector of natural inﬂows during
period t; pt be the vector of spills; It be the vector of ir-
rigation withdrawals; CR be the system connectivity matrix
(CR(j,k)=1(−1) when reservoir j receives(releases) water
from(to) reservoir k); CI is the connectivity matrix of the
irrigation system, i.e. CI(j,d)=α when reservoir j receives
return ﬂows from the irrigation site d and/or CI(j,d)=−1
when water is diverted from reservoir j to the irrigation site
d; et be the vector of evaporation losses; s and s are vec-
tors with the minimum and maximum storage volumes re-
spectively; r and r are vectors with the minimum and maxi-
mum releases respectively; πh is the vector of energy prices
($/MWh); θh is the vector of variable costs for hydropower
generation($/MWh); ch is the vector of production coefﬁ-
cient (MW/m3 s−1); τ is the number of hours in period t.
With the above deﬁnitions and using L hyperplanes to
approximate Ft+1, the one-stage optimization problem be-
comes
Ft(st,qt−1) = max{ft(st,qt,rt) + Ft+1} (1)
subject to
st+1 − CR(rt + pt) = st + qt − et(st) + CI(It) (2)
st+1 ≤ st+1 ≤ st+1 (3)
rt ≤ rt ≤ rt (4)
ft(st,qt,rt) = τt
X
j
(πh
t (j) − θh(j))ch(j)rt(j) − ξ
,
t xt (5)

  
  
Ft+1 − ϕ1
t+1st+1 ≤ γ 1
t+1qt + β1
t+1
. . .
Ft+1 − ϕL
t+1st+1 ≤ γ L
t+1qt + βL
t+1
(6)
Details on the determination of hyperplanes coefﬁcients
β, ϕ and γ can be found in Tilmant and Kelman (2007). The
set of results available at the optimal solution includes the
optimal allocation policies at each stage t, i.e the vectors rt
and pt, and the marginal water values λw,t, i.e. the Lagrange
multipliers associated with the mass balance Eq. (2).
To incorporate irrigation net beneﬁts into the objective
function of SDDP, we need a new state variable that would
indicatethestatusoftheirrigationsectoratanypointinspace
and time. As explained in Tilmant et al. (2008), the new state
variable, denoted yt, represents the total volume of water al-
located to the crops from the beginning of the irrigation until
current stage t. It is equivalent to a reservoir that would reﬁll
during the irrigation season with the irrigation withdrawals
it, which are now decision variables, and that would be de-
pletedwhencropsareharvestedandsold. Fornotationalsim-
plicity, we assume one irrigation demand site per abstraction
point, but the model can handle as many “irrigation reser-
voirs” as the number of crops. The immediate beneﬁt func-
tion ft at stage t can now include up to three terms: (i) net
beneﬁts from hydropower generation, (ii) penalties for vio-
lating operating constraints and (iii) net beneﬁts from irriga-
tion. While the ﬁrst two terms can be observed all year long,
the third one can only be observed at the end of the growing
season, when agricultural products are harvested and sold.
Let ti and tf be the ﬁrst and last stages of the irrigation sea-
son respectively and  be the vector of irrigation efﬁciencies.
When t6=tf, the immediate beneﬁt function is simply (5),
whereas when t=tf, that function becomes
ft(st,qt,rt,yt) = τt
X
j
(πh
t (j) − θh
t (j))ch(j)rt(j) (7)
− ξ
,
t xt
+
X
d
ˆ gd(yd
t )
where ˆ gd is the net beneﬁt function at the irrigation demand
site d.
With the above immediate beneﬁt function, the one stage
SDDP optimization problem corresponding to the second
(dynamic) formulation can be written as
Ft(st,qt−1,yt) = max {ft(st,qt,rt,yt) + Ft+1} (8)
subject to
st+1 − CR(rt + pt) − CI(it) = st + qt − et(st) (9)
yt+1 − it = yt (10)
State and decisions variables have lower and upper
bounds:
st+1 ≤ st+1 ≤ st+1 (11)
rt ≤ rt ≤ rt (12)
it ≤ it ≤ It (13)
Hydrol. Earth Syst. Sci., 13, 1091–1101, 2009 www.hydrol-earth-syst-sci.net/13/1091/2009/A. Tilmant et al.: Agricultural-to-hydropower 1095
y
t+1 ≤ yt+1 ≤ yt+1 (14)
Assuming there are L hyperplanes used to approximate
Ft+1, the remaining constraints are:

  
  
Ft+1 − ϕ1
t+1st+1 − η1
t+1yt+1 ≤ γ 1
t+1qt + β1
t+1
. . .
Ft+1 − ϕL
t+1st+1 − ηL
t+1yt+1 ≤ γ L
t+1qt + βL
t+1
(15)
where ηt+1 is a vector of slopes with respect to the new state
variable yt+1. As explained in Tilmant et al. (2008), ηt+1
is also derived at stage t+1 from the Lagrange multipliers
λy,t+1 associated with the constraints (10).
2.3 Financial compensation
Dynamically managing water resources in a river basin con-
sists in continuously adjusting allocation decisions based on
the status of the system, which is represented here by the
inﬂows and the storage levels in the reservoirs. For exam-
ple, underdryconditions, marginalwatervalueswillincrease
therefore signaling that priority be given to most productive
uses. However, to make those efﬁcient allocation decisions
socially acceptable, a compensation mechanism must be de-
veloped in order to compensate the water users who have to
forgo some (or all) of their individual beneﬁts so that social
beneﬁts are maximized. Here, the compensation mechanism
will take the form of a ﬁnancial transaction from the down-
stream user who beneﬁt from the water transfer to the up-
stream user who has to give up some (or all) of his water.
To assess the ﬁnancial transactions we need the marginal
water values at all sites j and for each time period t. In the
absence of a water market, the value of water is represented
by accounting or shadow prices, which can be obtained using
mathematical programming as a deductive method (Young,
2005). As mentioned earlier, the marginal water values λw
are available at the optimal solution of the SDDP algorithm;
they correspond to the Lagrange multipliers (shadow prices)
associated with the mass balance Eq. (9). They give the
change in the total net beneﬁts due to the availability of an
additional unit of water at any site.
Let It(j) be the monthly prescribed volume of water to be
diverted from reservoir j to the irrigation district j. Tak-
ing into account the efﬁciency (j) of the irrigation sys-
tem, the crop water requirements correspond to It(j)(j).
Without rationing, the sum of the gross monthly water al-
locations should equal the prescribed annual entitlement,
i.e.
Ptf
t=ti it(j)=I(j). As pictured on Fig. 1, we will assume
that there is one hydropower plant and one irrigation district
per site. Finally, we must also make the distinction between
at-source (λw) and at-site (λ∗
w) water value: the former is ob-
served at a location where bulk water is diverted, whereas the
latter corresponds to the value of water delivered to the farm-
ers, i.e at the end of the conveyance and distribution system.
Reservoir - site 1
Power plant - site 1
s(1)
l(1)
r(1)
q(2)
q(1)
s(2)
l(2)
r(2)
q(J)
s(J)
l(J)
r(J)
...
Reservoir - site 2
Power plant - site 2
Reservoir - site J
Power plant - site J
Irrigation - site 1
Irrigation - site 2
Irrigation - site J
Fig. 1. Cascade of hydropower-irrigation reservoirs.
At-site value exceeds the at-source value by whatever costs
are required to store, transport, and distribute water.
The total compensation α(j) of the j-th user should at
least cover the forgone beneﬁts, i.e. the value of the water
transfers (It−it) over the irrigation season.
α(j) =
tf X
t=ti
[It(j) − it(j)]λ∗
w,t(j) (16)
Assuming that the conveyance costs are negligible (gravity
irrigation) but that losses are signiﬁcant, (16) can be written
as a function of the at-source water value:
α(j) =
tf X
t=ti
[It(j) − it(j)]λw,t(j)(j)−1 (17)
The individual contributions of downstream power plants
can then be derived from (17) using the chain rule:
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α(j) =
tf X
t=ti
[It(j) − it(j)]λw,t(j)(j)−1 (18)
=
tf X
t=ti
[It(j) − it(j)]

λw,t(j) − λw,t(j + 1)

(j)−1
+
tf X
t=ti
[It(j) − it(j)]

λw,t(j + 1) − λw,t(j + 2)

(j)−1
...
+
tf X
t=ti
[It(j) − it(j)]

λw,t(J) − λw,t(J + 1)

(j)−1
where λw,t(J+1)=0. For example, the ﬁnancial transaction
α(j+k,j) between the (j+k)-th hydropower plant and the
j-th irrigation district (Fig. 2) is given by:
α(j + k,j) =
tf X
t=ti
[It(j) − it(j)] (19)
×

λw,t(j + k) − λw,t(j + k + 1)

(j)−1
where λw,t(j+k) and λw,t(j+k+1) are the marginal wa-
ter values upstream and downstream of the (j+k)-th hy-
dropower plant respectively. The difference between these
two marginal water values reﬂects the productivity of that
power station.
The compensation paid by the (j+k)-th hydropower plant
to the upstream irrigation districts is
α(j + k) =
j+k X
j=1
α(j + k,j) (20)
=

λw,t(j + k) − λw,t(j + k + 1)

×
j+k X
j=1
[It(j) − it(j)](j)−1
A comparison between the static and dynamic allocation
approaches will be carried out next using the Euphrates sys-
tem in Turkey and Syria as a case study. To achieve this, the
two SDDP formulations described in Sect. 2 will be devel-
oped and implemented to determine the optimal allocation
policies and the corresponding marginal water values. Then,
from these results, the ﬁnancial compensation between the
hydropower and irrigation sectors will be assessed using the
methodology explained above.
2.4 The Euphrates river in Turkey and in Syria
The Euphrates in Turkey and in Syria is essentially charac-
terized by two projects: the GAP in Turkey and the Tabqa
Hydropower – site j+k
 
w(j+k)
 
w(j+k+1)
 i(j) Irrigation – site j
Demand = I(j) Water flux
Financial 
transaction
Fig. 2. Financial compensation of an upstream irrigation district by
a downstream power plant.
scheme in Syria. The GAP is one of the largest water re-
sources development project in the world involving the con-
struction of 22 dams, 19 hydroelectric power plants with
an installed capacity of 7526MW, and the irrigation of
1.7×106 ha in the Turkish part of the Euphrates and Tigris
river basins. The GAP has always been considered as a
strategic project for the Turkish authorities since the 1970s
and the successive governments never gave it up despite the
ﬁnancial difﬁculties. The project is now behind schedule,
with only 10% of the projected irrigation area in 1998, and
the delays are not going to resorb as international funding
agencies are not ready to ﬁnance international water projects
without an agreement between co-riparians. Thus, Turkey is
likely to bear alone the ﬁnancial burden of the GAP unless
it can agree on the question of sharing waters with Syria and
Iraq (Kliot, 1994). The main Turkish dams built in the Eu-
phrates are Keban, Karakaya, Ataturk, Birecik and Karkamis
(Fig. 3). The main characteristics of these dams are listed in
Table 1.
In Syria, the Tabqa scheme which includes a hydropower
plant (880MW) and several irrigation districts was also
planned in the 70ies. In the ﬁrst project made by the So-
viets, 850000ha were to be irrigated with the water of the
Tabqa reservoir (lake Assad). This rather optimistic esti-
mate has been downgraded several times and nowadays only
200000ha are operational on the left and right banks of the
Euphrates (Alia, 2007).
3 Dynamic versus static management of the Euphrates
river in Turkey and in Syria
To illustrate the concept of dynamic management of a wa-
ter resources system, we will use the Euphrates river basin
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Table 1. Major dams in the Euphrates.
Name Id Rated Capacity Storage capacity Irrigation
Keban Kn 1240MW 31.0km3
Karakaya Ka 1800MW 9.58km3
Ataturk Ak 2400MW 48.7km3 √
Birecik Bk 672MW 1.22km3 √
Karkamis Ks 180MW 0.157km3
Tishreen Tn 630MW 1.88km3
Tabqa Ta 880MW 14.16km3 √
KEBAN
KARAKAYA
ATATURK
BIRECIK
KARKAMIS
Euphrates
SYRIA
TURKEY
TISHREEN
TABQA
Reservoir
Hydropower plant
Irrigation
Fig. 3. Euphrates system in Turkey and Syria.
in Turkey and Syria. This system is used for illustrative pur-
pose only as there is virtually no cooperation and coordina-
tion between riparians. We will therefore imagine that there
is an institution responsible for (1) optimally allocating water
between the different reservoirs and irrigation areas, (2) col-
lecting water demands and water users’ productivities, and
(3) calculating the ﬁnancial transactions between those who
are better-off and those who are worse-off with the dynamic
allocation scheme. Considering the large number of users,
some level of aggregation is needed:
– Hydropower sector. Hydropower plants are individually
considered but not turbines.
– Agricultural sector. All irrigation areas/districts sup-
plied by the same reservoir are aggregated into a sin-
gle irrigation district, and the corresponding irrigation
water requirements (W) are assumed to be the ofﬁcial
(planned) ones, i.e. 10000m3/ha/yr in Turkey (Kolars
and Mitchell, 1994) and 12500m3/ha/yr in Syria (Alia,
2007). Irrigation efﬁciencies () are assumed to be 45%
in Turkey and 40% in Syria.
Table 2 lists the relative contribution of each month to the
annualcropwaterrequirementsforacroppingpatternrelying
both on cereals (winter and spring wheat) and cotton. We can
see that much of the irrigation water withdrawals (it) will
take place during the summer, from June to August.
With the above information, irrigation withdrawals, i.e. at-
source irrigation water requirements, (It) can be calculated
from
It = wt
W

(21)
The analyzed system is depicted in Fig. 3 with 5 hy-
dropower plants in Turkey and 2 in Syria. Two major irriga-
tion districts are connected to the Ataturk and Birecik reser-
voirs in Turkey and one district is supplied by the Assad lake
(Tabqa reservoir) in Syria. With such system, the vectors of
initial storage volumes st and accumulated water yt have 7
and 3 elements respectively.
Static allocation rules are ﬁrst determined with the SDDP
model (1)–(6): net beneﬁts from hydropower generation are
maximized for given, static, volumes of water diverted to the
three irrigation districts. In other words, at each stage t, irri-
gation withdrawals it are identical to at-source irrigation de-
mands as long as there is enough water available in storage,
i.e. st+qt−et≥It.
System performance associated with the static allocation
is then estimated from simulation analysis using historical or
syntheticﬂows. Here, 50syntheticmonthlyinﬂowsequences
are used to simulate the Euphrates system over a planning
horizon of ﬁve years (T=60), but simulation results are an-
alyzed for year 3 only. This corresponds to a “steady state”
condition which avoids the initial hydrological and storage
conditions and the “end-effect” distortion due to the reser-
voirs depletion that happens as the end of the planning period
approaches (Tilmant and Kelman, 2007). The 50 sequences
are assumed representative of the stochastic inﬂow process
and constitute a trade-off between representativeness and
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Table 2. Relative monthly irrigation water demands – wt.
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
– – – – 0.08 0.30 0.33 0.18 0.10 0.03 – –
computation time. A planning period of ﬁve years is required
to deal with the multiyear storage capacity of some of the
reservoirs listed in Table 1. The more interesting simulation
results for this study consists of the following (50×12) ma-
trices: monthly volumes of water diverted for irrigation pur-
poses from each reservoir, monthly releases through the tur-
bines of each plant, the monthly spillage losses, monthly hy-
droelectric production of each plant, and monthly at-source
marginal water values. These results are obtained after im-
plementing the SDDP model (1)–(6) in simulation by ex-
ploiting the last (updated) set of piecewise linear beneﬁt-to-
go functions Ft available at each stage t; t∈[1,···,T]. Note
that the term it in the mass balance Eq. (2) correspond to the
at-source irrigation water demands It as explained above.
The same procedure is repeated with the SDDP model (8)–
(15) where allocation rules are chosen so as to maximize net
beneﬁtsfrombothhydropowergenerationandcropirrigation
using exactly the same hydrologic sequences as before with
the static allocation. The only difference is that the decisions
to allocate water in space and time are only driven by the pro-
ductivity of the hydropower plants and irrigation districts. In
otherwords, it becomesadecisionvariableanditisnolonger
guaranteed that irrigation water demands will be met (it≤It),
especially during dry periods when the marginal water value
increases. As a matter of fact, during dry periods it may be-
comemoreeconomicallyefﬁcienttoreallocatedownstreama
portion of the irrigation water demand (It) as upstream farm-
ers are competing with several downstream non-consumptive
users.
The analysis of simulation results reveals that the expected
net beneﬁts with a dynamic allocation is larger than that ob-
tained with a static management approach. The average dif-
ferencebetweenannualnetbeneﬁtsis64millionUS$, which
corresponds to a 6% increase with respect to the static ap-
proach. Figure 4 displays the cumulative distribution func-
tion of the differences between annual net beneﬁts. We can
see that 90% of the time the difference will be greater than
20millionUS$, with a maximum of 160millionUS$. We
can also see that this difference is always positive, even dur-
ing wet years when water is not scarce. The reason is to
be found in that the development of the irrigation areas in
Turkey was carried out independently of downstream ripar-
ians, therefore leading to overcommittment in the upstream
part of the basin. If GAP were to be planned taking into ac-
count downstream water demands and productivities, Turk-
ish irrigation areas and their water demands would probably
be smaller. The difference between static and dynamic ben-
                             
 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
           
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. Statistical distribution of the differences between dynamic
and static annual beneﬁts.
eﬁts would also become negligible during wet years. In a
sense, the extent of the differences between static and dy-
namic net beneﬁts reveal the degree of cooperation and co-
ordination when planning water resources development in a
river basin.
A closer look at the hydropower and agricultural sectors is
also revealing: on average, net beneﬁts from the hydropower
sector increase by 93.4millionUS$, whereas the agricultural
sector looses as much as 29.5millionUS$. As expected
the agricultural sector is worse-off with the dynamic allo-
cation and a compensation mechanism must be established
whereby the hydropower sector would ﬁnancially compen-
sate the agricultural sector for increasing the availability of
water. However, since hydropower plants can be owned by
different companies, the ﬁnancial transactions must be devel-
oped between each power plant and each irrigation district
according to the rules described in Sects. 2–3.
Figure 5 displays the average annual contribution of each
power plant to the ﬁnancial compensation of the three ir-
rigation districts. The contribution of each power station
is ﬁrst calculated using Eq. (21) for each simulation se-
quence, and then averaged over the 50 sequences. The
Ataturk hydropower plant only compensates the Ataturk ir-
rigation district and the average payment would be around
9.9millionUS$. The downstream power plant, Bire-
cik, would compensate the upstream irrigation districts,
i.e. Ataturk (2.5millionUS$) and Birecik (1.8millionUS$).
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Fig. 5. Average contribution of the hydropower plants (mil-
lionUS$).
Since more water is reallocated from the Ataturk irrigation
scheme, the compensation is larger than that required for the
Birecik irrigation scheme. The same pattern is observed for
the Karkamis and Tishreen hydropower plants and we can
see that their contribution is proportional to their productiv-
ity. Finally, Tabqa must compensate three irrigation districts:
Tabqa, Birecik and Ataturk. Again, each irrigation district
would be compensated in proportion to the volume of water
being reallocated downstream. Table 3 lists the average indi-
vidual contribution of the hydropower plants to the ﬁnancial
compensation of the three irrigation districts.
The extent to which the reallocation is taking place de-
pends on the hydrologic status, which in turn is the outcome
of a stochastic process. The ﬁnancial compensation there-
fore varies according to the availability of water is the sys-
tem, which is captured here with the 50 different simulation
sequences. Figure 6 displays the statistical distributions of
the annual compensations received by the Ataturk irrigation
district from the downstream power plants (Ataturk, Birecik,
Karkamis, Tishreen and Tabqa). We can see that the annual
transaction varies between 3.2 and 37.6million US$, with
an average of 19.3million US$. During dry years (with an
exceedance probability of 90%), the compensation will be
at least equal to 29.5millionUS$, out of which 15.2, 5.6,
4.0, 3.5, 1.2millionUS$ come from Ataturk, Tabqa, Bire-
cik, Tishreen and Karkamis hydropower plants respectively.
Conversely, because little reallocation is taking place during
wet years, the ﬁnancial compensation is limited to less than
9 million US$ 10% of the time. Figures 7 and 8 show the
empirical statistical distributions of the annual compensation
of Birecik and Tabqa irrigation demand sites. As we move
downstream, fewer power plants participate in the compen-
sation of the irrigation sites, making the reallocation less at-
tractive.
                        
 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
           
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                        
 
 
           
           
            
            
         
     
Fig. 6. Statistical distribution of the individual contribution of the
hydropower plants – Ataturk Irrigation Site.
4 Conclusions
Dynamically managing water resources in a river basin con-
sists in continuously adjusting allocation decisions based on
the status of the system and thus on marginal water values.
Under dry conditions, marginal water values will increase
therefore signaling that priority be given to most productive
uses. However, to make those efﬁcient allocation decisions
socially acceptable, a compensation mechanism must be de-
veloped in order to compensate the water users who have
to forgo some (or all) of their individual beneﬁts so that so-
cial beneﬁts are maximized. This paper has presented a con-
ceptual framework in which the water resources system is
centrally managed by a river basin organization which deter-
mines optimal allocation decisions in space and time in such
a way that the overall productivity is maximized. Then, the
additional beneﬁts obtained by this dynamic reallocation are
redistributed to affected water users. In a system with large
agricultural and energy sectors, upstream farmers are likely
to be the ﬁrst to see their entitlements reduced in case of
droughts because downstream users, especially power com-
panies, would form a coalition in order to attract as much wa-
ter as possible downstream. This conceptual framework was
tested on the cascade of hydropower-irrigation reservoirs in
the Euphrates river basin. It was shown that a dynamic man-
agement increases the annual expected beneﬁts by 6% and
that the corresponding amount can be used to compensate
the agricultural sector. We also presented a mechanism to as-
sess the individual contribution of each hydropower plant to
the ﬁnancial compensation of upstream farmers.
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Table 3. Average contribution of the hydropower plants (millionUS$).
Hpp-Ataturk Hpp-Birecik Hpp-Karkamis Hpp-Tishreen Hpp-Tabqa Total
Irrigation-Ataturk 9.9 2.5 0.8 2.3 3.8 19.3
Irrigation-Birecik 0.0 1.8 0.6 1.8 2.9 7.2
Irrigation-Tabqa 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 2.0
Total 9.9 4.3 1.4 4.1 8.7 28.5
                  
 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
           
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                        
 
 
           
            
            
         
     
Fig. 7. Statistical distribution of the individual contribution of the
hydropower plants – Birecik Irrigation Site.
                         
 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
           
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                      
 
 
         
     
Fig. 8. Statistical distribution of the individual contribution of the
hydropower plants – Tabqa Irrigation Site.
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